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A method for solving the Byzantine agreement problem [M. Fitzi, N. Gisin, and U. Maurer, Phys.
Rev. Lett. 87, 217901 (2001)] and the liar detection problem [A. Cabello, Phys. Rev. Lett. 89,
100402 (2002)] is introduced. The main advantages of this protocol are that it is simpler and is
based on a four-qubit singlet state already prepared in the laboratory.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 02.50.Le, 03.65.Ud, 03.65.Ta
I. INTRODUCTION
Some interesting applications of the N -particle N -level
singlet states have been recently introduced [1]. Partic-
ularly, the three three-level singlet state
∣∣∣S(3)3
〉
=
1√
6
(|012〉 − |021〉 − |102〉+ |120〉
+ |201〉 − |210〉) (1)
(the lower and upper indexes refer, respectively, to the
number of constituents and the dimension of the Hilbert
space of any of the constituents of the composite sys-
tem) was shown to be useful for solving the “liar detec-
tion problem” [1], which is a simplification of a classi-
cally unsolvable problem in quantum computing called
the “Byzantine generals’ problem” or the “Byzantine
agreement problem” introduced in two seminal papers
by Lamport, Pease, and Shostak [2, 3], and inspired by
a pseudohistorical scenario [4]. A version of this problem
was previously solved by Fitzi, Gisin, and Maurer [5] also
using the three three-level singlet state. Ref. [1] ended
by remarking that the preparation of the required states
would pose a formidable challenge. Meanwhile, Gisin has
proposed a method for preparing the three three-level sin-
glet state [6]. To my knowledge, no experimental results
have as yet been reported.
On the other hand, the Munich group [7] (see also
Ref. [8]) has prepared, using parametric down-converted
photons entangled in polarization, a four-qubit entangled
state that can be expressed as
∣∣∣S(2)4
〉
=
1
2
√
3
(2|0011〉 − |0101〉 − |0110〉
−|1001〉 − |1010〉+ 2|1100〉). (2)
This state belongs to a family of states of N (even) qubits
that generalizes the familiar two-qubit singlet state
∣∣∣S(2)2
〉
=
1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). (3)
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Any member of this family can be expressed as
∣∣∣S(2)N
〉
=
1
N
2 !
√
N
2 + 1
∑
permutations
of 0...01...1
z!
(
N
2
− z
)
!(−1)N2 −z
× |ij . . . n〉 , (4)
where the sum is extended to all of the states obtained
by permuting the state |0 . . . 01 . . . 1〉, which contains the
same number of 0’s and 1’s; z is the number of 0’s in
the first N/2 positions (for example, in |01〉, z = 1; in
|1100〉, z = 0; in |010110〉, z = 2). Expression (4) is
similar to that introduced in Ref. [1] for the N -particle
N -level singlet states (which, according to the notation
introduced here, should be denoted as |S(N)N 〉).
The interesting point is that the N -qubit “singlet” [9]
states given by Eq. (4) share some properties with the
N -particle N -level singlet states introduced in Ref. [1].
Both are nonseparable and N -lateral unitary invariant.
Nonseparability means that no local model can mimic
the predictions of quantum mechanics for these states
[10] and implies that the outcomes of the measurements
do not reveal predefined results. N -lateral unitary invari-
ance means that, if we act on any state with the tensor
product of N equal unitary operators, the result will be
to reproduce the same state:
U
⊗
N |ψ〉 = |ψ〉 , (5)
U
⊗
N being U ⊗ . . . ⊗ U , where U is a unitary oper-
ator. This implies that the same correlations between
the outcomes of measurements on the N particles occur
for different sets of measurements. Both properties were
essential to the solutions to the problems proposed in
Refs. [1, 5]. The question is whether the |S(2)N 〉 states
can be used to perform tasks that, so far, were specific
to the |S(N)N 〉 states.
The |S(2)N 〉 states can be used to distribute crypto-
graphic keys [11, 12], encode quantum information in
decoherence-free subspaces [13, 14, 15, 16], perform se-
cret sharing, and teleclone quantum states (telecloning
is a process combining quantum teleportation and opti-
mal quantum cloning from 1 input toM outputs) [17]. In
fact, for N ≥ 4, the |S(2)N 〉 states are the N -lateral unitary
invariant version of the telecloning states introduced in
2Ref. [17]. In this paper, I shall show that the state |S(2)4 〉
can also be used to solve the Byzantine generals’ and liar
detection problems.
The Byzantine generals’ problem is a classical problem
in distributed computing defined as follows. N generals
are connected by secure pairwise classical channels. A
commanding general must send an order to his N−1 lieu-
tenant generals such that: (a) All loyal lieutenant gener-
als obey the same order; (b) if the commanding general is
loyal, then every loyal lieutenant general obeys his order.
If the commanding general is loyal, (a) follows from (b).
However, the commanding general may be a traitor.
The Byzantine generals’ problem is a metaphor for dis-
tributed processes, some of which may be faulty. For
N = 3 generals and 1 traitor the problem has no classi-
cal solution, as proved in Refs. [2, 3]. However, a version
thereof can be solved with the aid of quantum mechanics.
The protocol proposed in Ref. [5] solves the Byzantine
generals’ problem for N = 3 in the following sense: if all
generals are loyal then, after the protocol, all the gener-
als would obey the commanding general’s order. If one
general is a traitor then, after the protocol, either the
two loyal generals would obey the commanding general’s
order or abort the process.
As can be easily seen, the Byzantine generals’ prob-
lem for N = 3 generals and 1 traitor is equivalent to the
liar detection problem defined as follows [1]: three par-
ties A(lice), B(ob), and C(arol) are connected by secure
pairwise classical channels. A sends a message m to B
and C, and B forwards the message to C. If both A and
B are honest, then C should receive the same message
from A and B. However, A could be dishonest and send
different messages to B and C, mAB 6= mAC , or, alterna-
tively, B could be dishonest and send a message that is
different from that he has received, mBC 6= mAB. For C
the problem is to ascertain without a shadow of a doubt
who is being dishonest.
In Sec. III I shall introduce a protocol based on
the |S(2)4 〉 state for solving the liar detection problem
(and thus also the Byzantine generals’ problem) in the
following sense: if both A and B are honest then C will
receive the same message from A and B. If one of A and
B is dishonest then, after the protocol, either C ascertain
who is being dishonest or C does not accept the message
from one of the parties A and B.
Before getting into the details of the protocol, it would
be useful to give a rough idea of how it works: besides
their messages, A and B must send some additional infor-
mation. For instance, A must also send B some private
information correlated with the message. B and C must
be able to check the authenticity of the information they
have received by using private information. In addition,
to convince C that the message B is sending her is actu-
ally that B received from A, B would also need to send C
the information B has received from A. In this scenario,
being a liar means that she/he did not distribute the ap-
propriate additional information. The advantage derives
from the fact that C can detect the origin of the inap-
propriate information.
II. DISTRIBUTE AND TEST PROTOCOL
The protocol for solving the liar detection problem de-
scribed in Sec. III is based on the assumption that, at
the beginning of the protocol, A, B, and C share a large
number L of four-qubit systems in the |S(2)4 〉 state de-
scribed by Eq. (2) such that, for each four-qubit system
j (from 1 to L), A possesses two qubits (qubits j1 and
j2, or qubits j1 and j3, but she does not know which
two), B possesses one qubit (j3 or j2, but he does not
know which one), and C possesses the fourth qubit j4
and knows which qubits A and B have in their posses-
sion.
The purpose of this distribute and test protocol, pre-
ceding the protocol for liar detection, is to prepare the
initial scenario required for the second protocol and test
whether or not said initial scenario has been achieved.
The distribute and test protocol has only two possi-
ble outcomes: success or failure. In case of success, C
would assume that the required initial scenario has been
achieved and then the liar detection can be reliably ac-
complished. In case of failure, C would conclude that
something went wrong and would abort any subsequent
action.
The initial assumptions are that there are only three
parties involved: A, B, and C, and that they are con-
nected by secure pairwise classical channels and by noise-
less quantum channels.
The distribute and test protocol is as follows.
(i) C prepares a large number M > L of four-qubit
systems in the |S(2)4 〉 state. For each four-qubit system
j (from 1 to M), C sends two qubits (qubits j1 and j2,
or qubits j1 and j3) to A, one qubit to B (j3 or j2), and
keeps the fourth qubit for herself.
(ii) For each four-qubit system j sent, C checks
whether or not A and B have received the right num-
ber of qubits (two qubits for A and one for B).
(iii) C randomly chooses two large enough subsets S1
and S2 of the distributed four-qubit systems. These sub-
sets are used only to test whether or not the initial sce-
nario required for the protocol for liar detection has been
achieved. Qubits belonging to S1 and S2 will be dis-
carded at the end of the distribute and test protocol.
If Ni is the number of four-qubit systems in Si, then
M = N1 +N2 + L.
(iv) For each four-qubit system j of S1, C asks A to
send B her two qubits.
(v) C checks whether or not B has received A’s qubits.
(vi) C asks B to perform some measurements on each
of the three qubits (the two qubits B has received from
A plus the one that has been in B’s possession from the
start), and report his results to her by using the secure
pairwise classical channel between them. For instance, C
can ask B to perform a measurement of the spin along
the same direction on all three qubits, Mj.
3(vii) C performs a measurement on her corresponding
qubit. For instance, C can measure Mj. The outcomes
of B and C’s measurements must be correlated. For in-
stance, if they have measuredMj on the four qubits, two
of them must be “0” and the other two must be “1”; due
to unitary invariance, this occurs for any Mj . Due to
the fact that A’s qubits are entangled with B and C’s
qubits, the outcomes can be proved [10] to be genuinely
unpredictable (if one does not know the results of the
other measurements). C checks whether the expected
correlations occur.
(viii) For each four-qubit system j of S2, C follows the
same steps as in (iv)–(vii), only exchanging the roles of
A and B.
(ix) Since C’s choice of subsets S1 and S2 is known
by A and B only after all qubits have been distributed
among them, then, if all the outcomes are correctly corre-
lated, C would assume that the remaining L distributed
four-qubit systems are in the |S(2)4 〉 state and use them for
the protocol described below. If not, C would conclude
that something went wrong and abort any subsequent
action.
III. PROTOCOL FOR LIAR DETECTION
Let us suppose that the message m that A sends to B
and C, and B sends to C is a bit value “0” or “1” and
that all three parties agree to use the following protocol.
(I) For each four-qubit system, C asks A and B to per-
form the same measurement on their individual qubits.
After a large number of these measurements, both B and
C (A) are in possession of a long list of (pairs of) 0’s and
1’s lB, and lC (lA) such as the following.
Position lA lB lC
1 00 1 1
2 01 0 1
3 00 1 1
4 11 0 0
5 11 0 0
6 00 1 1
7 01 0 1
8 11 0 0
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Each of these lists has the following properties.
(a) It is random (i.e., generated by an intrinsically un-
repeatable method that gives each possible number the
same probability of occurring).
(b) It is correlated to the other two lists. If “00” (“11”)
is in position j in lA, then “1” (“0”) is in position j in
lB and lC .
(c) Each party knows only his/her own list.
(II) The message A sends B is denoted as mAB. In
addition to mAB, A must also send B the list l
(mAB)
A of
positions in lA in whichmAB appears twice. For instance,
if A sends B the message mAB = 0, then she must also
send B the list l
(mAB=0)
A = {1, 3, 6, . . .} since, in lA, “00”
appears in positions 1, 3, 6,. . . Note that, if the sequences
are random and long enough, then the length of l
(mAB=0)
A
must be about one-quarter of the total length L of the
list lA.
(III) B would not accept the message if the re-
ceived list l
(mAB)
A is not compatible with lB or the
length of l
(mAB)
A ≪ L/4. For instance, if l(mAB=0)A =
{1, 2, 3, 6, . . .}, then B would not accept the message be-
cause “0” is in position 2 in lB, so A cannot have “00”
in this position.
Requirements (II) and (III) force A to send B infor-
mation which is correct but perhaps incomplete. Other-
wise, if A sends a list containing n erroneous data, then
the probability that B does not accept the message mAB
would be at last (2n − 1)/2n.
(IV) The message B sends C is denoted as mBC . B
must also send C a list l
(mBC)
A , which is supposedly the
same l
(mAB)
A that B has received from A.
(V) The message A sends C is denoted as mAC . A
must also send C a list lAC , which is supposedly lA.
(VI) When C finds that mAC 6= mBC , she has three
lists lC , l
(mBC)
A , and lAC , to help her find out whether
it is A or B who is being dishonest. C must first check
whether lAC is consistent with lC . If not, then A is the
liar. If yes, then C must check whether l
(mBC)
A has an ap-
propriate length and is consistent with lAC . If not, then
B is the liar. At this stage, this is the only possibility.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
The main practical advantage of the introduced proto-
col over those presented in Refs. [1, 5] is that it requires
a simpler quantum state (a four-qubit state instead of
a three-qutrit state) which has been already prepared
in a laboratory [7]. This would make the new protocol
immediately applicable for solving both the Byzantine
generals’ and liar detection problems. The main theoret-
ical advantage is that the introduced protocol seems to be
fundamental in a greater degree than those in Refs. [1, 5],
in the sense that it requires that only one party uses trit
values, instead of all three parties.
Although both the Byzantine generals’ and liar detec-
tion problems assume that the parties are connected by
secure pairwise classical channels (secure messengers in
Ref. [4]), this is an unrealistic constraint for real applica-
tions. Note, however, that the protocol described above
also works if the classical channels between A and C, and
between B and C are not secure but public and unjam-
able (i.e., which cannot be tampered with). Obviously,
such a channel cannot be used to distribute delicate in-
formation (like, for instance, whether or not the gener-
als will attack, or the lists l
(mBC)
A and lAC), but can be
4used, together with an additional quantum channel, to
implement a standard quantum key distribution proto-
col [11, 12] to send this delicate information. The final
picture gives us a quantum solution to a problem with-
out classical solution: the liar detection problem without
secure classical channels.
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